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The Reconfiguration of Natura and Ars in Cartesian Rhetoric and the 




This article discusses the change in the relationship between natura and ars that occurred when 
Cartesian language theories penetrated conceptions of rhetoric in France during the 17th century. In part 
one, the article considers the reception of Descartes by the French universities and collèges in order to 
explore what I call the epistemic transfer between Aristotelianism and the new Cartesian philosophy. 
The focus then shifts to Bernard Lamy’s conception of rhetoric as presented in his principal work De 
l’art de parler (1675). Based upon the Cartesian theory of passions, Lamy’s book redefines rhetoric in 
a way that has been labelled in current research as a ‘grammar of affects’. The fundamentals of the ars 
rhetorica are thus substantially altered, however without eliminating the power of the rhetorical 
tradition. The third section turns to the prize contests of the French academies in the 18th century in order 
to show the extent to which the transformation of rhetorical theory affected the broader practice of 
eloquence. Moreover, the rhetorical prize contests demonstrate an explicit reflection on the diverging 
modes of knowledge production that are essential, on the one hand, to the exact sciences and, on the 
other, to the textual tradition. Particularly striking is the critique of scientific method that was developed 
by the defenders of rhetoric in the concours académique. 
 
I. Aristotelianism and natural knowledge from the perspective of rhetoric 
Loin cet orgueil philosophique 
Qui séduit la crédulité: 
Le doute sage et méthodique 
Seul éclaircit la vérité. 
Interprète de la nature, 
C’est à toi qu’elle a sans mesure 
Prodigué ses secrets divers. 
Viens disputer, nouveau Lyncée, 
Aux fiers élèves du lycée, 
L’honneur d’instruire l’univers. 
…2  
This ode to Descartes, for which Father Lisle from the congregation of the Doctrinaries was 
awarded the prix de poésie by the eminent Académie des Jeux Floraux in Toulouse in 1710, 
presents its protagonist as a truly epoch-making figure, setting his work apart from tradition. 
The author, a professor of rhetoric at the Collège de l’Esquille in Toulouse, subsequently guides 
																																																								
1 This article will be published in: Aristotelianism and Natural Knowledge at Early-Modern Protestant Universities, eds. Volkhard 
Wels and Pietro Omodeo, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2018. The research for this article was conducted at the 
Collaborative Research Center 980 “Episteme in Motion” (Freie Universität Berlin) as part of the project A07 Erotema. 
The Question as an Epistemic Genre in the Learned Societies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.  
2 “Descartes”, in: Recueil de plusieurs pièces d'éloquence et de poésie présentées à l'Académie des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 
1710, Toulouse 1710, pp. 1–6, here v. 1–10, p. 1. 
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the reader through the different areas of Descartes’ philosophy, with which he is clearly 
familiar. Beyond Cartesian astronomy and theory of matter,3 he is most impressed by the 
psychology, the theory of passions, that Descartes had developed. Lisle’s song of praise 
demonstrates his keen awareness of the ambivalence of this conception of the soul, which from 
its first appearance had led both to deterministic and to idealistic interpretations.4  As the 
“esclave souveraine”, in the author’s paradoxical phrase, the soul is subjected to the “lois du 
corps”, while at the same time it is the realm where “la matière, sans connaissance, reçoit […] 
des sentiments” and gains spiritual qualities.5 Although the ode does not explicitly invoke the 
pineal gland, the famous bridge connecting the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, it shows 
considerable knowledge of Descartes’ conception of the passions and of the far-reaching 
epistemological consequences of the “doctrine nouvelle”.6  
The new philosophical principles had a particular impact in the theory of affects which 
Descartes developed, or rather summed up, in Les passions de l’âme (1649).7 This conception 
of the passions in a way condenses the transformative elements that put rhetorical theory on a 
new basis in the second half of the 17th century. This leads us to one of the main issues of this 
article: the reconfiguration of natura and ars in concepts of rhetoric inspired by Descartes. 
Accordingly, I seek to show from the perspective of the history of rhetoric how Aristotelianism 
and natural knowledge interacted in this particular field. This article deals with the complex 
processes of amalgamation between, on the one hand, the knowledge of the textual tradition 
based ultimately on the principles of Aristotelian dialectic and rhetoric and, on the other, 
empirical knowledge based on the observation of nature. This interaction led to a remarkable 
epistemic “transfer” in the rhetorical tradition.8 In order to reconstruct this transfer, I will first 
examine the reception of Cartesian philosophy in the universities and the collèges in France in 
the second half of the 17th century. I will then turn to the conception of a ‘new’ rhetoric in 
Bernard Lamy’s Art de parler (1675) before focussing finally on the epistemological reflections 
in the rhetorical prize contests held by the French academies in the 18th century. 
																																																								
3 See ibid., v. 41–60, pp. 3–4. 
4 Cf. Stéphane Van Damme, Descartes. Essai d’histoire culturelle d’une grandeur philosophique, Paris 2002, pp. 61–72 and pp. 
96–110 and François Azouvi, Descartes et la France. Histoire d’une passion nationale, Paris 2002, p. 32–35. 
5 Lisle, “Descartes”, v. 66, v. 77 and v. 83–84 (pp. 4–5). 
6 Ibid., v. 26, p. 2. 
7 Cf. Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus, Hamburg 2002, pp. 188–196.  
8 On the notion of transfer as the gradual change of knowledge that results from the complex interaction of traditional 
and novel epistemic elements see Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum/Anita Traninger, “Institution – Iteration – Transfer. Zur 
Einführung”, in: Wissen in Bewegung. Institution – Iteration – Transfer (Episteme in Bewegung. Beiträge zu einer transdisziplinären 
Wissensgeschichte, vol. 1), eds. Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum and Anita Traninger, Wiesbaden 2015, pp. 1–13. 
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This approach seems fruitful when we seek to understand Aristotelianism as a dynamic tradition 
of knowledge open to (certain) debate(s) in several ways. First, it allows us to see that also at 
the – catholic – universities in France the Aristotelian corpus could be applied to new contexts 
and, to a certain extent, be reinterpreted. Moreover, the case of Lamy demonstrates how 
difficult it was to forsake the enduring power of tradition, even when the endeavour was 
essentially founded on the new notion of nature. Finally, consideration of the prize contests of 
the French academies is not merely an end in itself. The prize questions allow us to examine 
how the contestants reflected on the intricate relationship between Aristotelianism and natural 
knowledge at that time. After the 1720s, this particular genre of public knowledge exchange 
actually stimulated an intense discourse on the relation between the textual tradition and the 
new sciences. This discourse bears witness to the reconfiguration of natura and ars which can 
be observed in the major rhetorical theories of the second half of the 17th century. 
II. Descartes in the university 
Research has established a very precise understanding of the reception of Descartes’ work in 
France in the 17th and early 18th century.9 Despite the strong resonance among the leading 
researchers of the age and before its triumph in the years after 1700, Descartes’ philosophy had 
to pass through a critical phase during which it met fierce opposition from the three major 
institutions: the church (particularly from the Jesuits), the theological faculties in the 
universities, and ultimately the Crown. The most spectacular occurrence of this confrontation 
undoubtedly took place in 1663 when the church placed Descartes’ writings on the Index 
Librorum Prohibitorum (even though with the somewhat milder notation of donec corrigantur, 
until corrected).10 
After the theological faculty of the university of Leuven officially forbid Descartes’ notion of 
substance in 1662,11 the ban of his teachings in the French universities soon followed. In 1664 
the University of Paris issued the first of several decrees demanding that physics classes should 
be based only on Aristotelian philosophy. In 1671 finally, the Sorbonne imposed an overall ban 
on the teachings of Descartes. Renewed in 1691 and 1704, it halted the introduction of Cartesian 
metaphysics into the theological curricula. The idea that matter and extension coincide was 
absolutely incompatible with the doctrine of transubstantiation. Many of the collèges, too, 
																																																								
9 See especially Van Damme, Descartes, pp. 27–137 and Azouvi, Descartes et la France, pp. 15–93. 
10 With Descartes’ death in 1650, however, this ban was actually definitive. Cf. Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Last 
Scholastics, Ithaca/London 1999, pp. 173–181 and Azouvi, Descartes et la France, pp. 23–28. 
11 See Van Damme, Descartes, p. 90. 
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implemented restrictive measures against Cartesianism, in part because of pressure from the 
Crown.12 
At the centre of one of the most intense controversies, we find Bernard Lamy (1640–1715), the 
professor of rhetoric and philosophy at the Oratorian collège in Angers.13 Lamy, to whose 
rhetorical work I will turn in the next section, early in his career had defended Cartesian 
ontology in metaphysical questions and continued to teach his positions on the res extensa in 
Angers (from 1673). When, like other Cartesians, he was suspected of advocating democracy 
as a more rational form of government than monarchy, he was suspended from office in August 
1675 by royal decree. The collège of Angers, which had long tried to protect him, was now 
forced to prohibit the teaching of Cartesian positions and to exile Lamy to the abbey of Saint-
Martin-de-Miséré near Grenoble. But thanks to the protection of the cardinal Le Camus, Lamy 
could again take up his courses of philosophy at the séminaire de Grenoble as well as publish 
his theories.   
The outcome of the Lamy affair already shows that, in the practice of university or college 
teaching, there remained some room for manoeuvre with regard to Cartesian philosophy, 
despite official prohibitions. In fact, there was a sustained interest in Descartes’s theories at the 
French universities and collèges from the 1660s, as especially Laurence Brockliss has shown.14 
This interest came from a number of professors who were willing to confront the new teachings 
and introduce them into their classes. The first to do so were the professors of physics, who 
discussed mechanistic principles within a system that was still dominated by the Aristotelian 
tradition. This process of assimilation continued to broaden with the result that by 1690, due to 
the work of various professors at the University of Paris and beyond, the basis for a more 
heterogeneous system of physics had been created. This system was capable of absorbing the 
main tendencies in contemporary natural philosophy – without abandoning the Aristotelian 
foundation of university physics.15  
The 1690s, then, marked a turning point as, from that time, the agenda was increasingly set by 
convinced adherents of Cartesian philosophy who sought to establish mechanics as the defining 
system of physics at the university. After the University of Paris had been won over in the early 																																																								
12 See ibid., pp. 96–102 and Azouvi, Descartes et la France 38–42. 
13 On the following see ibid., pp. 43–45. See also François Girbal, Bernard Lamy (1640-1715). Étude biographique et 
bibliographique, Paris 1964, pp. 28–42. 
14 See the fundamental work of Laurence W. B. Brockliss, French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. 
A Cultural History, Oxford 1987, pp. 197–216, 332–333 and pp. 345–376. 
15 Aristotelian physics, as Brockliss notes, had by then “become a highly eclectic philosophy”. Ibid., p. 350. See also 
idem, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, in: Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2/2: Frankreich und 
Niederlande, ed. Jean-Pierre Schobinger (Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Friedrich Ueberweg), Basel 1993, pp. 3–
32, here pp. 23–25. 
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1700s, the Cartesian cause soon became widely accepted. By 1720 “there was hardly a collège 
de plein exercice or a regular convent that had not succumbed” to the mechanists. Even though 
the professors may not have been wholesale supporters of every Cartesian position, the 
“rejection of Aristotle was rapid and universal”.16 The new teachings then penetrated even into 
the classes in logic and to a certain extent even in metaphysics.17 
It is particularly interesting to see how the professors dealt with the new philosophy of nature, 
especially in the period between 1660 and 1690 when it had not yet become the new consensus 
at the universities. In fact, they discussed Descartes’s theses within the traditional framework 
of the disputatio in order to see how they measured up against the Aristotelian system.18 The 
axioms of mechanist physics, including its empirical discoveries, thus fed into the dialectical 
logic of the disputation, which was originally designed to verify or refute propositions. This 
seeming paradox is understandable if one considers the fact that the disputatio remained an 
essential form of knowledge debate in the early modern period.19 Moreover, there are important 
parallels between the two modes of knowledge on a formal level, which facilitated this 
epistemic transfer. Both Aristotelians and Cartesians conceived of physics as a science based 
on deductive principles. Neither of the camps regarded physics as founded on observation and 
empirical data. The fact that the two deductive systems, axiomatic on the one hand, dialectical 
on the other, were quite different in nature was not a major problem to the professors; at least 
it did not stop them from combining the two modes of demonstration.20 Besides, both of these 
theories of physics were based on logical, rather than mathematical principles. Descartes and 
his followers, to be sure, attached crucial importance to mathematics, but principally as a model 
for clear deductive reasoning. It was only with Newton that the laws of nature were expressed 
in a purely mathematical language.21 
In their discussions of Descartes’s theories, the professors must certainly have realised 
substantial divergences from the Aristotelian tradition. In this regard, it is particularly 
interesting to see how they dealt with these differences and thus to examine the terms of the 
																																																								
16 Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 350–351. Brockliss consequently speaks of the “Cartesian era” between 1690 
and 1740. The last Aristotelian textbook by the Jesuit Gaspard Buhon actually appeared in 1723, ibid., p. 187. 
17 Cf. ibid., pp. 197–216.  
18 See ibid., pp. 337–350.  
19  On the persistence of the disputatio see especially the contributions in: Frühneuzeitliche Disputationen. Polyvalente 
Produktionsapparate gelehrten Wissens, eds. Marion Gindhart, Hanspeter Marti and Robert Seidel, Köln/Weimar/Wien 
2016 and Hanspeter Marti, “Disputation und Dissertation. Kontinuität und Wandel im 18. Jahrhundert”, in: Disputatio 
1200–1800. Form, Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur, eds. Marion Gindhart and Ursula 
Kundert, Berlin/New York 2010, pp. 63–85. See also Emmanuel Bury, “Les lieux de l’argumentation dans les discours 
médicaux du XVIIe siècle”, in: Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 35-54. 
20 See Brockliss, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, p. 29. 
21 See ibid., p. 30. 
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epistemic transfer. The most common attitude was the position of Aristotelian eclecticism, 
which basically preserved the traditional principles of physics while at the same time seeking 
to integrate the findings of the new philosophy of nature.22 It is striking to see how important it 
was to the professors to make the new teachings appear as traditional as possible. Consequently, 
they preserved the Aristotelian notions of form and element, and they referred to their positions 
as Aristotelian although they were based on the principles of matter and motion. In this way, 
Descartes could even be presented as a materialist Aristotelian. This was the perspective taken 
by François Bayle, a professor of philosophy at the university of Toulouse, who in 1700 
dedicated an entire textbook to the reconciliation of Aristotle and Descartes. 23  The more 
‘radical’ professors on the other hand tended to present Aristotle as a mechanist avant la lettre 
whose theories had been wrongly interpreted later by the scholastics.24  
When the divergences from the Aristotelian model were too serious, they were either tacitly 
ignored or reinterpreted; sometimes the new facts were simply denied. The latter applies 
especially to the cases of superlunary comets, new stars, and solar maculae.25 Regarding the 
sunspots, the professors in fact denied their existence in order to prevent harm to the Aristotelian 
system. Although they had to admit the empirical observation of the phenomena they countered 
by denying that the spots were situated on the sun.26  
The reception of Descartes in the French universities and collèges is also significant in terms 
of the confessional dimension natural knowledge had assumed in the early modern period. It 
clearly shows that, in the 17th century, the dynamic tradition of Aristotelianism was not the 
privilege of the Protestant universities. It is true that many of the professors who were 
particularly open to Cartesian theories were reform-oriented Oratorians27 or even close to 
Jansenism and hence in a certain way theologically predisposed to the Augustinian heritage in 
Descartes’ philosophy.28 Moreover, the secular philosophy professors played an important part, 
especially at the University of Paris. Nevertheless, all of these university lecturers were, of 
course, of the Catholic persuasion and, more importantly, they taught at catholic institutions. 
																																																								
22 Cf. Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 352–359. 
23 See idem, “Der Philosophieunterricht in Frankreich”, p. 27. 
24 See ibid. 
25 See Brockliss, French Higher Education, pp. 342–344. 
26 See ibid., p. 342. 
27 Cf. the detailed prosoprographic documentation in ibid., pp. 459–477, here especially pp. 463–468; see also ibid., 
pp. 348–350. 
28 On this relation see Azouvi, Descartes et la France, pp. 24–27 and Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, p. 182. 
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Finally, even among the professors of physics who were receptive to Cartesian philosophy there 
were many Jesuits.29 
In the next section, the analysis of Bernard Lamy’s Art de parler will demonstrate the epistemic 
transfer that resulted when the Cartesian notion of nature was introduced into the field of 
rhetoric. 
III. Bernard Lamy and the Reconfiguration of Natura and Ars in Cartesian Rhetoric 
“Les passions ont des caractères particuliers avec lesquels elles se peignent elles-mêmes 
dans le discours.”30 
In the first place, it has to be emphasised how Cartesian philosophy fundamentally challenged 
rhetoric.31 According to Descartes, the reasonable inner nature of man representing the rational 
external order is the only legitimate and valid source of knowledge, at least as far as the 
programmatic level of Cartesian epistemology is concerned. The central position of nature (both 
external and internal to man) as the field of methodical investigation, the deeply rooted 
scepticism towards all (verbal) media interfering with the direct study of the objects of nature 
and the inward turn in the interior monologue of reason with itself were all factors that not only 
undermined the status of rhetoric, but compelled Descartes to reject it in the Discours de la 
méthode (1637):  
J’estimais fort l'éloquence, et j’étais amoureux de la poésie; mais je pensais que l’une et 
l’autre étaient des dons de l’esprit, plutôt que des fruits de l’étude. Ceux qui ont le 
raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux leurs pensées, afin de les rendre 
claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader ce qu’ils proposent, encore 
qu’ils ne parlassent que bas-breton, et qu’ils n’eussent jamais appris de rhétorique. Et 
ceux qui ont les inventions les plus agréables, et qui les savent exprimer avec le plus 
d’ornement et de douceur, ne laisseraient pas d’être les meilleurs poètes, encore que 
l’art poétique leur fût inconnu.32  
																																																								
29 On the confessional dimension see also Brockliss’s conclusion regarding France and other parts of Catholic Europe 
in The Cambridge History of Science (ed. Roy Porter, vol. 4: Eighteenth-Century Science, Cambridge e.a. 2003, p. 46): “The 
Jesuit and other Aristotelian professors” did not teach “a physics completely oblivious of contemporary developments 
in the natural sciences: sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotelianism was a vibrant and eclectic physical 
philosophy that successfully incorporated most of the new observational discoveries”. 
30 Bernard Lamy, La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, 4th Ed., Amsterdam 1699 (repr. Brighton 1969; abbreviated below as 
“Adp”), book II, chap. 7, p. 108. 
31 On the following see in particular Thomas M. Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric: Varieties of Cartesian Rhetorical 
Theory, Carbondale/Edwardsville 1990, especially pp. 1–5 and pp. 26–31, Gilles Declercq, “La rhétorique classique 
entre évidence et sublime (1650–1675)”, in: Histoire de la rhétorique dans l'Europe moderne (1450–1950), ed. Marc Fumaroli, 
Paris 1999, pp. 629–706, here pp. 638–645 and Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, pp. 174–190. 
32 René Descartes, Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les sciences, in: Œuvres de Descartes, 
ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, vol. 6, new Ed., Paris 1965, pp. 1–78, here p. 7.    
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As Descartes had stated earlier in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1628/29), rhetoric, only 
probabilistic in nature, was not part of the “cognitio certa et evidens” that “omnis scientia” was 
to be.33  
Nevertheless, this denial of rhetoric, presented itself in a highly rhetorical manner,34 did not 
lead to the end of rhetoric. Instead, it provoked a new interest in the traditional art of persuasion: 
it re-focussed the question regarding what actually made a speech effective, or, more generally, 
how the spoken or written word could most effectively convey the intended message to the 
public. Besides, there was an urgent need to redefine the specific role of rhetoric among the 
various and evolving branches of learning.35 
Cartesian rhetoric – that is seventeenth-century conceptions of eloquence inspired by Descartes, 
including essentially the works of Bernard Lamy, Nicolas Malebranche, Géraud de Cordemoy, 
and the Logic of Port-Royal –36 is one distinct and particularly influential way to investigate 
these questions. In Bernard Lamy’s work La Rhétorique ou l’art de parler, first published in 
1675, the tensions between tradition and innovation resulting from the reconfiguration of natura 
and ars become most apparent.37 A success from the start, the book reached its sixth edition in 
1701 and remained a crucial reference in France throughout the 18th century. Lamy’s work was 
also widely read beyond France, thanks to an early translation into English and a later one into 
German. In Germany, Gottsched was one of its most fervent admirers.38  
In Lamy’s Art de parler, the crucial shift that is typical of the new Cartesian conception of 
rhetoric becomes especially evident. Eloquence is no longer conceived as an ars, that is as a 
learnable technique based upon certain normative rules. On the contrary, Lamy wants to 
develop a theory of language which analyses communication by means of linguistic and 
psychological methods.39 Accordingly, he seeks to explore the empirical mechanisms operating 
when the written or spoken word is used effectively and convincingly. This implies a 																																																								
33 “Omnis scientia est cognitio certa et evidens […]. Atque ita per hanc propositionem rejicimus illas omnes probabiles 
tantum cognitiones, nec nisi perfecte cognitis, et de quibus dubitari non potest, statuimus esse credendum”. René 
Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in: ibid., vol. 10, pp. 349–488, here p. 362.    
34 Cf. Marc Fumaroli, “Ego scriptor: rhétorique et philosophie dans le Discours de la méthode”, in: Problématique et réception 
du Discours de la méthode et des Essais, ed. Henry Méchoulan, Paris 1988, pp. 31–46; Roger Ariew, “Descartes’s Fable 
and Scientific Methodology”, in: Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 127–138. 
35 See Dietmar Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik. Untersuchungen zum Wandel der Rhetoriktheorie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, 
Tübingen 2004, pp. 297–302; Rudolf Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik. Studien zur französischen Theoriebildung der 
Affektrhetorik zwischen Cartesianismus und Frühaufklärung, München 1982, pp. 30–32. 
36 The term is used as in Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 297–340. 
37 For the following analysis, I rely heavily on the reconstruction and interpretation of Lamy’s work by Dietmar Till, 
Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 319–340. See also the crucial analysis by Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 
125–167. 
38 See John T. Harwood, “Introduction”, in: The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy, ed. idem, Carbondale 1986, 
pp. 131–163, here p. 131 and Girbal, Bernard Lamy, pp. 47–48. 
39 See Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, especially p. 303 and p. 314. 
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fundamental redefinition of the relation between natura and ars. This transformation was 
already axiomatic in the Logique of Port-Royal (1662), whose authors declare: “Ainsi cet art 
ne consiste pas à trouver le moyen de faire ces opérations, puisque la nature seule nous le 
fournit en nous donnant la raison: mais à faire des réflexions sur ce que la nature nous fait 
faire.”40 By denying the foundations of logic and rhetoric in the normative principles of an ars, 
Arnauld and Nicole also delegitimize, like Descartes in the passage quoted from the Discours 
de la méthode, the benefit of rules for those seeking to reason logically and to speak eloquently: 
“Tout cela se fait naturellement, et quelquefois mieux par ceux qui n’ont appris aucune règle 
[…], que par ceux qui les ont apprises.”41 This theoretical idea is diametrically opposed to the 
rhetorical tradition which had, of course, recognised the dimension of ingenium, the natural gift 
of the orator. But that had always been secondary to exercitatio and studium, the constant 
learning and practising of one’s skills by means of the authoritative classical texts.42 This 
demonstrates once again how deeply embedded the epistemological ideal of the “mirror of 
nature” had become, even in rhetoric.43  
What sets Lamy’s and the Port-Royal authors’ conceptions of rhetoric apart from Descartes, 
however, is the role attributed to language in the cognitive process. Even for Arnauld and 
Nicole, who in this respect are much closer to Descartes’s universal epistemological ideal of 
the esprit géométrique than Lamy, it is clear that, apart from the fields of logic and the exact 
sciences, language does influence human understanding. At least they concede that the 
established use of words and their polyvalence cannot be simply done away with and that this 
fact, though irrelevant to logic, is not irrelevant in a broader epistemological perspective.44 
What is more, Arnauld and Nicole, along with Augustine and the Doctrina Christiana, consider 
religious experience as the legitimate field for the evocation of strong affects. This realm is 
hence crucial to the “return” not of rhetoric but of the “rhetorical” in the Logique.45 Its source 
and its aim are the passions of the heart. 
																																																								
40 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l’Art de penser, ed. Pierre Clair and François Girbal, 2. rev. Ed., 
Paris 1993, p. 38 (my emphasis). On the Logic of Port-Royal see Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 62–87; 
Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 33–83 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 302–313. 
41 Arnauld/Nicole, La Logique, p. 38. 
42 See the fundamental article by Florian Neumann, “Natura-ars-Dialektik”, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. 
Gert Ueding, vol. 6, Tübingen 2003, col. 139–171 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 77–87; see also Henri-
Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité, 2. rev. Ed., Paris 1950, pp. 268–282 and pp. 359–389. 
43 The allusion is of course to Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, new Ed., Princeton/Oxford 2009, 
especially pp. 45–67. 
44 See the reflections on the “signification proper” in Arnauld/Nicole, La Logique, p. 94 and p. 100. This aspect is 
especially underlined by Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 84–86. 
45 Ibid., pp. 68–75. In this context, Carr also speaks of “the rhetorical without rhetoric”, ibid., pp. 85–87. See also 
Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 77–83. 
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The strongest criticism of Descartes in this context comes from Pascal. Assuming that different 
forms of reasoning and specific rationalities are involved in human understanding and, more 
fundamentally, that man’s cognitive faculties are inextricably linked to the passions of the soul 
and ultimately founded in an intuitive contemplation of the world, Pascal distinguishes the 
“esprit de justesse” and the “esprit de finesse” from the “esprit de géométrie”.46 The “esprit de 
finesse” in particular is the expression of spontaneous judgement beyond rational grasp. It relies 
on a sense of certainty conveyed by the human heart (“cœur”), which for Pascal represents the 
ultimate source of truth:  
Nous connaissons la vérité non seulement par la raison mais encore par le cœur. C’est 
de cette dernière sorte que nous connaissons les premiers principes et c’est en vain que 
le raisonnement, qui n’y a point de part, essaie de les combattre […]. Cette impuissance 
ne doit donc servir qu’à humilier la raison, qui voudrait juger de tout, mais non pas à 
combattre notre certitude comme s’il n’y avait que la raison capable de nous instruire.47  
Lamy’s Rhétorique takes a position that, like the Logique of Port-Royal, affirms the Cartesian 
idea of methodical science but at the same time gives considerably more weight to rhetoric.48 
The latter is considered the fundamental medium and propaedeutic tool without which 
philosophical findings could not be conveyed.49 According to Lamy, only through rhetoric are 
the abstract notions of philosophy made understandable to man as a sensual being, who is above 
all exposed to the suggestive powers of the passions. What is more, Lamy believes in the 
epistemological complementarity of mathematics and rhetoric which goes beyond the 
traditional ideal of a formal analogy between the two disciplines dating back to Quintilian. 50 
For Lamy, rhetoric’s task is to develop a natural language of affects which at the same time 
makes the passions of the heart work towards reason and the methodical ideal of the esprit 
géométrique.  To develop a deeper understanding of this theoretical approach, we now have to 
turn to Lamy’s argument presented in the Art de parler and especially to his conception of the 
passions. 																																																								
46 See Blaise Pascal, Pensées, in: idem, Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Le Guern, vol. 2, Paris 2000, fr. 465 and fr. 466, pp. 
741–744. On these specific forms of reasoning see Claude Chantalat, À la recherche du goût classique, Paris 1992, pp. 64–
70, Eduard Zwierlein, Blaise Pascal, Hamburg 1996, pp. 73–83 and Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 645 and pp. 
650–654.   
47 Pascal, Pensées, fr. 101, pp. 573–574. See also the famous passage from the Art de persuader: “Personne n’ignore qu’il 
y a deux entrées par où les opinions sont reçues dans l’âme, qui sont ses deux principales puissances, l’entendement et 
la volonté”, Œuvres complètes, ed. Jean Mesnard, vol. 3, Paris 1964, p. 413. For the on-going debate on the notion of 
cœur in Pascal see Vincent Carraud, Pascal et la philosophie, Paris 1992, especially pp. 250–273, Wilhelm Schmidt-
Biggemann, Blaise Pascal, München 1999, pp. 46–50 and Hervé Pasqua, “Le cœur et la raison selon Pascal”, in: Revue 
Philosophique de Louvain 95/3 (1997), pp. 379–394. 
48 See also Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of Rhetoric, pp. 137–141. 
49 See Lamy, Adp, pp. 316–339. On the relation of philosophy and rhetoric in Lamy see also Lyndia Roveda, “Des 
épines aux fleurs des mathématiques: l’enseignement des sciences chez Bernard Lamy”, in: Archives internationales 
d'histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 193–202 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 324–325. 
50 See especially Roveda, “Des épines aux fleurs des mathématiques”, pp. 199–201. 
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What is particularly interesting about Lamy’s chief work is the fact that, in some respects, it 
seeks to establish once more a system of rhetoric, even though the ars rhetorica had come under 
such severe criticism in the 17th century, especially in France, that the authors of the major 
treatises renounced the term “rhétorique”, preferring instead titles like Art de persuader (as for 
example Pascal’s work from 1660).51 Lamy, who explicitly refers to Augustine, Horace, and 
Quintilian, does not simply dismiss the tradition of rhetoric. He wants to revise it and take it to 
a new (theoretical) level. In fact, his work is originally divided into two independent parts, the 
first one dealing extensively with the “art de parler” in terms of an analytical theory of language, 
the second one, much shorter, treating the “art de persuader”.52 The latter part is, in a way, 
Lamy’s tribute to the officia-rhetoric, that is to the classical teaching system of eloquence which 
goes back to Cicero and Quintilian. It is highly significant that the traditional pillars of the ars 
rhetorica – to which Lamy refers symptomatically as “la science de gagner les cœurs”53 – are 
treated so briefly in the Art de parler.54 In fact, Lamy speaks very little of the rules of inventio 
and dispositio,55 two of the five major canons of the art, thereby marginalizing the logical and 
analytical dimension of rhetoric, which gets “amputée de l’art de la prevue”.56 This low esteem, 
notably for the system of topics, was well-established in the rationalist critique of rhetoric in 
France, especially in the Cartesian context.57  
It must appear even more symptomatic, however, that the principles of elocutio, that is the rules 
of style and tropes, which had constituted one of the key aspects of rhetoric since antiquity, do 
not figure at all in the framework of the art de persuader. Lamy intentionally removes these 
major topics from the traditional context and elaborates on them from the Cartesian perspective 
on language and the human passions developed as the art de parler in the first section of the 
book.58 Indeed, this new theoretical view of elocutio constitutes the centre-piece of Lamy’s (re-
)definition of rhetoric, which Dietmar Till has described as an “Affekt-Grammatik”, a grammar 
of affects.59 																																																								
51 Cf. Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 632. 
52 It is only with the quoted edition from 1699, that the “discours” on the “art de persuader” is integrated into the 
work as the “livre cinquième” (comprising less than one fifth of the entire book). See also Till, Transformationen der 
Rhetorik, p. 322. 
53 Lamy, Adp, p. 330. 
54 This fact puzzled contemporary critics until the end of the 18th century. Cf. Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 
321–324. On the traditional system of the officia oratoris see ibid., pp. 71–97 and Karl-Heinz Göttert, Einführung in die 
Rhetorik. Grundbegriffe, Geschichte, Rezeption, 4th rev. Ed., Paderborn 2009, pp. 27–71. 
55 See Lamy, Adp, pp. 306–314 and the critical conclusion regarding “cette méthode des lieux” (pp. 314–316). On 
dispositio see ibid., pp. 354–365.  
56 Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, p. 644. 
57 See ibid., pp. 632–646 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 89–92 and pp. 305–307. 
58 See especially the “livre second” of the Art de parler, pp. 85–152. 
59 Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 328–334. Regarding the Logique of Port-Royal, Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, 
pp. 77–83, also speaks of a “grammaire affective”. 
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Dismissing the rules of the ars, Lamy seeks to demonstrate that eloquent speech stems rather 
from the natural use of language, that is from its use in accordance with certain natural 
principles. Instead of prescribing rules with which to structure an eloquent speech, he wants to 
disclose its non-intentional mechanisms in order to explain what actually happens when 
communication achieves the effect of convincing others. For Lamy, the key lies in the passions. 
In essence, he assumes that “les passions sont bonnes en elles-mêmes: leur seul dérèglement 
est criminel. Ces sont des mouvements dans l’âme qui la portent au bien, et qui l’éloignent du 
mal”.60 Moreover, the effective regulation of the passions is not a normative matter but rather 
depends on their correct internal economy. Believing that “l’on ne peut faire agir les hommes 
que par le mouvement des passions”,61 Lamy makes the case for fighting passions with counter-
passions, even if the latter are dangerous as such.62 Rightly conceived, rhetoric must hence be 
a rhetoric of affect that represents the natural movements of the heart – “les mouvements du 
cœur”.63 This means not only that the orator must appeal to the emotions of the audience – that, 
to be sure, had been a founding principle of the ars rhetorica since Aristotle. According to 
Lamy, eloquent speech is the direct expression of the human heart which uses the natural means 
of passions to articulate itself. Thus, the passions themselves are reflected in language, “les 
passions se peignent elles-mêmes dans le discours”.64 For Lamy, the language of the heart is 
superior to any form of knowledge written in books: “Il n’y a point de meilleur livre que son 
propre cœur; c’est une folie de vouloir aller chercher dans les écrits des autres ce que l’on trouve 
chez soi”.65 
In the Art de parler, the human heart takes on exceptional significance as the primordial, natural 
source of rhetoric. The crucial means for turning the “movements of the heart” into language 
are the tropes and figures of speech. They are of fundamental importance to Lamy since there 
is no “langue assez riche et assez abondante pour fournir des termes capables d’exprimer toutes 
les différentes faces sous lesquelles l’esprit peut se représenter une même chose”.66 Again, this 
is only partly surprising against the backdrop of rhetorical tradition and especially given the 																																																								
60 Lamy, Adp, p. 343. 
61 Ibid., p. 344. 
62 Lamy thus thinks that the evocation of stimulating affects is the best remedy against inhibiting passions, even when 
it comes to strong emotions like anger. If “la colère” is considered “un mouvement, une affection de l’âme qui nous 
anime à vaincre les empêchements qui nous retardent la possession de quelque bien”, no one can say “raisonnablement 
qu’il n’est pas permis d’exciter la colère et se servir de son mouvement pour animer les hommes à chercher le bien 
qu’on leur propose.” Lamy even concludes that: “dans les passions les plus déréglées […] il y a toujours quelque chose 
de bon”. Ibid., pp. 343–344.  
63 Ibid., p. 263. See also p. 108 and pp. 251–254. Lamy also speaks of the “mouvements de l’âme”, ibid., especially pp. 
231–232.  
64 Ibid., p. 108 (see also above, footnote 30).  
65 Ibid., p. 136. See also Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, p. 332. 
66 Lamy, Adp, p. 90. 
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appreciation of the tropes in early modern rhetorical theory.67 What is new, however, is Lamy’s 
theoretical explanation of the origins of the tropes: “Ce n’est point l’art qui les règle; ce n’est 
point l’étude qui les doit trouver [sic], ce sont des effets naturels de la passion”.68 
Moreover, in Lamy’s description of the tropes the physiological conception of language typical 
of the Art de parler – a work that starts with a chapter on the “organes de la voix” and discusses 
style in the context of the “qualité de la substance du cerveau et des esprits animaux” –69 
becomes particularly evident. The tropes are in fact considered the immediate correlate of the 
physiological impact of affects. They directly represent the movements of the passions and 
“imprint” them into the mind of the reader: “Les figures impriment dans l’esprit des lecteurs 
les passions dont elles sont les caractères”.70 From here the impressions find a direct way into 
language, which in Lamy appears, of course, a peculiarly passive medium: “Le discours est 
l’image de l’esprit: on peint son humeur et ses inclinations dans ses paroles sans que l’on y 
pense”.71 Here, Lamy shows himself as a firm adherent of Cartesian language theory in general 
and in particular follows the approach of Géraud de Cordemoy’s Discours physique de la parole 
(1668).72 
Compared to Lamy’s theoretical conception, the discussion of the diverse tropes and figures of 
speech, which constitutes a major part of the second section of the Art de parler, appears fairly 
traditional.73 This contrast is symptomatic of a greater ambivalence, that is to say the hybrid 
character of a work throughout which traditional and novel elements are inextricably linked and 
overlap one another. This is due to the specific way in which Lamy redefines the relation 
between natura and ars. Actually, Lamy merely inverts this constellation and gives new 
theoretical explanations to well-established rhetorical issues. Lamy’s reinterpretation of 
Quintilian’s famous comparison of the art of rhetoric with fencing is particularly symptomatic 
in this respect.74 Quintilian refers to a fencer who, fighting without art and tactical training, acts 
merely impetuously. It is only by means of those qualities that he can overcome his adversary, 
like a good orator outdoes his opponent with well chosen and well prepared words. Lamy 
actually inverts this simile by arguing that every fighter (or as he says “soldat”) in imminent 
																																																								
67 Cf. Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 310–313, Declercq, “La rhétorique classique”, pp. 644–649 and Göttert, 
Einführung in die Rhetorik, pp. 149–166. 
68 Lamy, Adp, p. 137 (my emphasis). 
69 Ibid., pp. 1–5 and pp. 249–252. The physiological approach is very pronounced throughout the entire work.  
70 Ibid., p. 293.  
71 Ibid., p. 249. 
72 On Cordemoy see Behrens, Problematische Rhetorik, pp. 87–95 and Till, Transformationen der Rhetorik, pp. 314–319. 
73 See the listing of the over thirty tropes and figures of speech which Lamy treats in short articles like entries in a 
dictionary, Adp, pp. 92–100 and pp. 114–135. 
74 Cf. ibid., pp. 137–141 and pp. 362–363. See also Göttert, Einführung in die Rhetorik, pp. 165–166. 
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danger resorts by natural impulse of the passions to the feints and postures that will save him 
from defeat.75 Yet, despite the pronounced re-interpretation, the traditional image symbolising 
the role of the ars rhetorica remains untarnished. Lamy alters the theoretical background which 
leads to essentially different explanations. But he does not change the substance of the rhetorical 
tradition in itself. 
Nevertheless, the new theory of rhetoric as the natural language of the passions emanating from 
the human heart was most influential on the way eloquence was conceived until well into the 
18th century. This becomes particular evident when we turn to the prize questions of the French 
academies. 
IV. The Epistemological Reflections in the Prize Questions of the French Academies 
“C’est un sentiment […] auquel il faut se livrer pour le connaître, et que l’âme est 
d’autant moins capable d’étudier, qu’elle en est plus affectée.”76 
Finally, the prize competitions held by the French academies offer us a source that is 
particularly suitable to assess how deeply the transformations of rhetorical theory penetrated 
into the wider practice of eloquence in France in the 18th century. In fact, the prize questions 
represent a genre that mostly attracted authors of average intellectual backgrounds. The 
participants were typically members of the lower clergy, of the parlements or the artes faculties 
of the universities, but also, to a minor (though increasing) extent, gens de lettres.77 Especially 
after the 1720s, the concours académique turned into a popular medium of the Republic of 
Letters, appealing to more and more participants all over France and beyond. This is above all 
due to the fact that the contests, judged on the basis of strict anonymity, were open to the general 
public without any restrictions based on social rank, gender, money, or institutional 
membership.78 The prize questions of the French academies, more specifically the eloquence 
competitions, must thus be considered a supremely valuable source for an intellectual history 
of rhetoric at an intermediate level: beneath the lofty heights of the preeminent rhetorical 
theories, they provide rich evidence of the actual practice of eloquence in 18th century France.  
																																																								
75 “La passion le rend adroit et ingénieux; elle lui fait trouver des armes”. In the case of the orator, these weapons are 
none other than the tropes: “Les figures sont les armes de l’âme”. Lamy, Adp, pp. 137–138. 
76 Recueil des ouvrages de poésie et d'éloquence, présentés à l'Académie des Jeux Floraux, en l’année 1765, Toulouse 1765, pp. 58–
59. 
77 On the sociology of the participants see the chapter on the concours académique, which is still fundamental to the study 
of this particular genre, in Daniel Roche’s magisterial work Le siècle des lumières en province. Académies et académiciens 
provinciaux, 1680–1789, 2 vols, Paris 1978, vol. 1, pp. 324–355, here pp. 336–339. 
78 On the regulations of the concours académique and its practical implications see the detailed descriptions in Jeremy L. 
Caradonna’s essential monograph: The Enlightenment in Practice. Academic Prize Contests and Intellectual Culture in France, 
1670–1794, Ithaca/London 2012, pp. 40–87, especially pp. 50–53 and pp. 78–87.  
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It is all the more significant then that the discours (by a certain M. Taverne) that won the prize 
at the Académie des Jeux Floraux in Toulouse in 1733 leaves no doubt that it is the specific 
task of eloquence “d’exprimer dignement les sentiments de notre âme” and, what is more, that 
“la nature, qui veut conduire tous les hommes à la connaissance de la vérité, a profité des 
dispositions de leurs cœurs pour parvenir à ses desseins”. To do so, nature only employs, 
according to the author, “les moyens les plus conformes à nos inclinations. Telle est l’origine 
de l’éloquence”.79 The same view is taken by the two other texts submitted that the academy 
did not select for the prize, but nevertheless decided to publish in its annual recueil. One of 
them draws the concise, very Lamy-like conclusion: “La vraie éloquence […] trouve dans les 
passions mêmes de quoi vaincre les passions”.80 These positions are indeed very common 
among the authors writing on the nature and function of eloquence in the rhetorical prize 
questions of the 18th century.81 The competition held by the Académie de Pau in 1739: “La 
sagesse n’interdit pas les plaisirs; mais elle en règle l’usage” even adopts one of the new axioms 
as its subject matter.82 So in this particular genre and context, too, we find the redefinition of 
eloquence as a rhetoric of affect, focussed essentially on the passions of the human heart (cœur), 
permitting their natural and thus their most effective expression. As such, rhetoric persuades 
less by normative prescriptions than by appealing to the (right) dispositions of the heart. 
																																																								
79 “Discours qui a remporté le prix, par le jugement de l’Académie des Jeux Floraux, en l’année 1733”, in: Recueil de 
plusieurs pièces de poésie et d'éloquence présentées à l'Académie des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1733, Toulouse 1733, pp. 
131–148, here p. 134 and pp. 142–143. 
80 “Troisième discours”, in: ibid., pp. 168–188, here pp. 180–181. The second discours argues likewise that eloquence 
essentially “sert à toucher le cœur des auditeurs” and regards the human heart as the seat of truth: “la vérité a des droits 
si incontestables sur son cœur”. Following the inclinations of the heart eloquence must even “donner à la vérité et à la 
sagesse les mêmes attraits qui lui faisaient préférer la volupté”. Ibid., pp. 149–167, here pp. 150–151 and p. 166. 
Everything thus depends on “maîtriser le cœur de l’homme pour régler ses penchants”, as the third discourse notes. 
Eloquence in this way realises man’s natural disposition towards truth, “les rappelle aux premières sources du vrai, à 
ces dons que la nature a faits à tous les hommes pour leur servir de guide”. Ibid., p. 169 and p. 171. 
81 See as another, earlier example the answers to the question “Si la sagesse qui vient du tempérament est aussi sûre 
que celle qui vient de la raison”, proposed by the Académie des Jeux Floraux in 1725, in: Recueil de plusieurs pièces 
d'éloquence et de poésie présentées à l'Académie des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1725, Toulouse 1725, pp. 65–84., pp. 
85–108 and pp. 109–128. The discourse selected for the prize also argues that “les passions nous fournissent elles-
mêmes des preuves incontestables de la force de l’homme […]. Si quelquefois elles maîtrisent son cœur, il peut les 
dompter à son tour; et en les sacrifiant les unes aux autres, il n’en est point qu’il ne puisse soumettre […]. L’homme 
est naturellement porté à la perfection […]. Il ne peut donc trouver son bonheur que dans la connaissance et dans la 
possession d’un bien auquel il puisse aspirer. Il faut qu’il remplisse son cœur”. Ibid., p. 68 and pp. 77–78. The second 
discourse is even convinced that “la sagesse qui vient de la raison est moins sûre dans son principe, parce qu’elle est 
plus sujette à l’erreur que celle qui vient du temperament”. This is due to the fact that “la sagesse qui est fondée sur un 
penchant naturel au bien, sera plus ferme dans son attachement pour la vertu, que celui qui n’a que la raison en partage”. 
Ibid., p. 88. On the shift towards a rhétorique du cœur in the eloquence prize questions see also my article, “Les médias 
de la réflexion sur le savoir: concours académique, journalisme savant et les discours sur la question du goût”, in: 
Friedrich Melchior Grimm – philosophe et homme de réseaux dans l’Europe des Lumières, eds. Kirill Abrosimov and Jonas Hock 
(Romanische Studien, Beiheft 2018), pp. 
82 Accordingly the discourse selected for the prize (by the père Chabaud) argues that “la sagesse […] ne nous fait point 
pratiquer la vertu par contrainte et par devoir; mais elle nous la rend aimable et nous donne du goût pour ce qu’elle 
nous prescrit. Elle nous enseigne une philosophie d’usage qui n’a rien de rebutant”. Pièces d’éloquence et de poésie qui ont 
remporté le prix au jugement de l’Académie royale des sciences et belles lettres établie à Pau, Paris 1746, pp. 3–19, here p. 12. 
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What is particularly remarkable about the prize competition of 1733 in Toulouse is the fact that 
the question (or rather the thesis) proposed by the Académie des Jeux Floraux, one of the 
strongholds of rhetorical tradition in France,83 had an explicit focus on truth: “L’éloquence ne 
doit avoir d’autre objet que de faire connaître la vérité”. Nevertheless, none of the texts 
published by the academy contains any explanations of how truth can be established by means 
of a traditional or revised system of topics. The whole logical and analytical tradition of rhetoric 
thus seems cast aside and irrelevant to its actual purpose. Instead, the emphasis is essentially 
placed on the style and the effects to be evoked by the rhetoric of the passions. Truth seems 
indeed to have become a matter of the heart.  
This tendency is not the only noteworthy aspect in the evolution of the rhetorical prize 
competitions. Since the 1730s, the questions set aimed explicitly at launching a debate over the 
contemporary development of knowledge. This led to what one can call a self-reflection of 
knowledge;84 a self-reflection based amongst other things on the beginning specialisation of 
knowledge and further stimulated by the appearance of the Encyclopédie in the 1750s.85 This 
development is especially striking when one considers the early history of the prize questions 
at the French academies. The genre seemed hardly predestined, in fact, for such a self-reflective 
turn.  
Established in 1670 at the Académie française in the disciplines of poésie and éloquence (the 
prizes being distributed annually in one of the categories) the concours académique was, on the 
one hand, first of all the medium of the panegyric on Louis XIV and a forum for the discussion 
of traditional theological and moral topics on the other. This was the case both in the capital 
and in the provincial academies.86 It is only in the course of the eighteenth century, in the wake 
of the second wave of academy foundations after the 1720s, that new fields of knowledge were 
explored and that the range of subjects treated in the prize competitions started to increase. This 
was above all due to the new disciplines of the concours académique, namely the scientific 
prize questions, established first at the Académie de Bordeaux in 1715 and then at the Académie 
																																																								
83 Not only was the tradition of poetry contests held in Toulouse since the 14th century one of the origins of the 
academic prize questions. The statutes of the Jeux Floraux also served as the model for the structure and regulations of 
the concours when it was introduced at the Académie française in 1670. See Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 
15–16, 21–26 and p. 42. 
84  Cf. Martin Urmann, “Zwischen prix de dévotion, Wissensreflexion und Reformdiskurs. Die Preisfragen der 
französischen Akademien als literarische und epistemische Gattung und die Frage nach dem ‘Jugement du Public’ an 
der Akademie von Besançon aus dem Jahr 1756”, in: Aufklärung 28 (2016), pp. 105–133, here pp. 128–129. 
85 On the specialisation of knowledge which at the time, to be sure, still took place within the one community of 
scholars called the Republic of Letters, see the contributions in: La république des sciences, eds. Irène Passeron, René 
Sigrist and Siegfried Bodenmann [Dix-huitième siècle 40 (2008)], especially the introduction by the editors (pp. 5–27) and 
the articles by Jean-Pierre Schandeler (pp. 315–332) and René Sigrist (pp. 333–357). 
86 Cf. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 23–32. 
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Royale des Sciences in 1720, and the historical contests held at the Académie des Inscriptions 
et Belles-Lettres since 1734 and soon spreading to the provincial academies, too. 87  The 
concours thus mirrored the contemporary spectrum of knowledge in its tendency towards 
growing differentiation. At the same time, this meritocratic medium of emulation, which 
registered an increase from 48 contests in the decade from 1670 to 1679 to 476 competitions in 
the 1780s, appealed to more and more aspiring members of the Republic of Letters. When it 
was abolished by the National Convention in 1793, the concours académique had mobilized 
altogether over 10,000 participants.88 
The scientific prize competitions undoubtedly represented an important source of innovation 
within the concours académique. The questions produced genuine contributions to 
contemporary scientific research. Very quickly, they became a medium – like scholarly 
journals, much more accessible and flexible than books – where current problems were 
collectively discussed by major and (still) unknown researchers. The numerous successes of the 
Bernoulli family (Jean and his two sons), the Euler family (above all Leonard, but also Charles 
and Jean-Albert) and of Lavoisier are only the most obvious evidence in this context. 89 
Moreover, the prix de science continuously gained in epistemic as well as in quantitative 
importance representing 60 per cent of the whole number of contests in 1793.90 The new 
empirical knowledge of nature thus found its way into a genre that had originally been 
established for cultivating the tradition of poetry and eloquence and hence, epistemically 
speaking, the knowledge of the textual tradition. 
Despite the changing functions and topics of the concours académique, the rhetorical and 
poetical prize questions remained one of the pillars of this popular medium for the entire 18th 
century. Contrary to the opinion so dear to current research on the prize questions, the eloquence 
contests must not be considered as the progressive forum for the factual debate of new 
																																																								
87 See ibid., pp. 88–89 and also the most valuable Appendix F listing all the prize contests offered by academies, scholarly 
societies, and agricultural societies in Continental France from 1670 to 1794, URL: 
http://www.jeremycaradonna.com/appendix-f, 28.02.2018 (pp. 335–515 ). 
88 Cf. ibid., p. 45. Caradonna estimates the total number of participants in the concours académique between 1670 and the 
abolition of the academies in 1793 at between twelve and fifteen thousand. In comparison, the total number of 
academicians in France over the period amounts to 6.000 (male) persons. 
89 See James E. McClellan, Science Reorganized. Scientific Societies in the Eighteenth Century, New York 1985, p. XXVII and 
p. 94; see also Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, p. 92 and p. 149. The brothers Jean and Daniel Bernoulli 
personally noted, as mentioned by McClellan (Science Reorganized, pp. 11–12), that their research on the theoria magnetis 
was launched by the corresponding prize contest at the Académie Royale des Sciences which they won in 1746 together 
with Euler and Dutour. 
90 Furthermore, the scientific prize questions had numerically outrun the poetic and rhetorical competitions, which 
constituted 30 per cent of the whole number of contests, by the middle of the 18th century. Cf. Roche, Le siècle des 
lumières en province, vol. 1, pp. 343–344. 
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knowledge.91 Neither should they be seen in the sceptical tradition of the early modern essay. 
In fact, the discourses of the prix d’éloquence were heavily influenced by the dialectical 
tradition of the question as an “epistemic genre”.92 It is thus a technique of knowledge deeply 
rooted in scholasticism, in the quaestio and notably the practice of disputations at the 
universities,93 that strongly shapes the academic genre of the prize contests. That is all the more 
surprising since early modern academies actually presented themselves in strong opposition to 
the universities and reproved the old methods of the ‘schools’.94 
The mode of arguing, especially in the early rhetorical prize questions, is therefore 
astonishingly close to the form of debate known from university disputations. In fact, the texts 
submitted to the eloquence contests all seek to defend a thesis by refuting the arguments put 
forward against it. Apart from this technique of argumentation based on clear-cut oppositions 
and the traditional rhetorical ways of amplification, the subjects of the prize questions at the 
Académie française also remind us of the contemporary university context. The genre had 
actually been established as a prix de dévotion with a quite narrow focus on conventional moral 
and theological topics.95 The discourse which won the prize in 1673 on the question – proposed 
in the form of a thesis to be defended: “De la Science du Salut opposée aux vaines et mauvaises 
connaissances, et aux curiosités blâmables et défendues” consequently argues in favour of 
religious knowledge which is praised in the starkest possible contrast to idle philosophical 
curiosity.96 																																																								
91 The article by Gunhild Berg, “Sind Preisfragen die aufklärerisch-öffentliche Form der disputatio? Ein Antwortversuch 
am Beispiel der Berliner Volksbetrugs-Frage von 1780”, in: Disputatio 1200–1800, pp. 167–199, is symptomatic of this 
tendency. The prize questions are presented as the future-oriented replacement of the disputatio as they allowed the 
open reflection of new knowledge. 
92  It is especially Gianna Pomata who has employed the notion of “epistemic genre”, in order to designate a 
“standardized textual format […] handed down by tradition for the expression and communication of some kind of 
content […] primarily cognitive in character”. Gianna Pomata, “Observation Rising: Birth of an Epistemic Genre, 
1500–1650”, in: Histories of Scientific Observation, eds. Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck, Chicago/London 2011, 
pp. 45–80, here p. 48. 
93 On the disputation and its epistemological as well as its practical implications, see Anita Traninger, Disputation, 
Deklamation, Dialog. Medien und Gattungen europäischer Wissensverhandlungen zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus, Stuttgart 
2012. On continuities and changes in this essential medium of the early modern Republic of Letters, see the 
contributions in: Frühneuzeitliche Disputationen (as mentioned above, note 19). 
94 Cf. McClellan, Science Reorganized and Roger Hahn, “The Age of the Academies”, in: Solomon’s House Revisited. The 
Organization and Institutionalization of Science, ed. Tore Frängsmyr, Canton 1990, pp. 3–12. For a critical revision of this 
self-fashioning of early modern academies which points out important continuities between these institutions and the 
universities, see Mordechai Feingold, “Tradition versus Novelty. Universities and Scientific Societies in the Early 
Modern Period”, in: Revolution and Continuity. Essays in the History and Philosophy of Early Modem Science, eds. Peter Barker 
and Roger Ariew, Washington 1991, pp. 45–59. 
95 Cf. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice, pp. 23–30. 
96 See the selected “discours” (by the abbé de Melun de Maupertuis), in: Recueil de pièces d’éloquence, présentées à l’Académie 
française pour les prix qu’elle distribue, vol. 1, 1671–1685, Amsterdam 1750, pp. 129–154. For a more detailed analysis see 
Urmann, “Zwischen prix de dévotion, Wissensreflexion und Reformdiskurs”, pp. 117–20. The texts of eminent literary 
quality for which Mademoiselle de Scudéry (“De la gloire”, 1671) and Fontenelle (“De la patience”, 1687) won the 
eloquence contests of the Académie française must thus be considered as the exceptions to the standard of 
conventional rhetoric that is characteristic of the prix de dévotion. 
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In the course of the 18th century, however, the eloquence contests also underwent an important 
change, both regarding the modes of argumentation and the subjects proposed. Under the 
influence of Enlightenment discourse the prize questions, notably at the provincial academies, 
dealt more and more with the new philosophical topics of the age, in particular with the 
changing role of the arts and sciences and the epistemic status of rhetorical knowledge in 
relation to the observational knowledge of the flourishing natural sciences. The self-reflective 
turn of the rhetorical prize contests is induced, on the one hand, by the specific focus of the 
questions proposed, as for example: “Combien les sciences sont redevables aux belles-
lettres”/“Combien les belles-lettres sont redevables aux sciences” (Jeux Floraux, 1753/1757), 
“Si la multiplicité des ouvrages en tout genre est plus utile que nuisible aux progrès des sciences 
et des belles-lettres” (Académie de Pau, 1754), “En quoi consiste l’esprit philosophique?” 
(Académie française, 1755), “Quelle a été l’influence de la philosophie sur ce siècle?” 
(Académie de Besançon, 1772) and, naturally, “Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a 
contribué à épurer les mœurs”, the most famous competition won by Rousseau at the Académie 
de Dijon in 1750. On the other hand, such reflections can also come up in contests less directly 
related to epistemic matters, as for example the numerous questions on taste (“gout”) at the 
provincial academies after the 1730s,97 on “L’utilité des bibliothèques publiques” (Académie 
de Pau, 1746) or, as we shall see in detail, in the competition of the Académie de Dijon for 
1757: “Est-il plus utile d’étudier les hommes que les livres?”.  
Most remarkably, in these eloquence prizes we can witness how the rhetoric of affect is used 
as a fundamental critique of the claim to universal knowledge asserted by the exact sciences. 
This critique of science and of its belief in method is at the same time a self-reflection of the 
rhetorical production of (text-)knowledge. To conclude, I want to analyse two examples from 
the eloquence prizes in which the typical arguments of this critique, based on the central notion 
of cœur,98 are developed in a particularly elaborate manner. 
The prize contest of the Académie française for the year 1755: “En quoi consiste l’esprit 
philosophique?” is actually one of the very rare occasions when this illustrious institution took 
up a much debated, contemporary philosophical issue before its eloquence competitions began 
to be devoted almost exclusively to eulogies on the grands hommes, which lasted until the 
																																																								
97 On these competitions see Urmann, “Les médias de la réflexion sur le savoir”, pp. 
98 Instead of the “rhetoric of affect” I will hence speak more specifically of the rhetoric of the heart in the following 
analysis. 
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abolition of the concours.99 The answer selected for the prize, by the Jesuit Father Guénard, 
begins with a survey of the development of contemporary knowledge. The author cannot but 
pay tribute to the “nouvel ordre de choses” arising from the “génie d’observation” which has 
kept accumulating more and more findings, “mille vérités particulières”.100 This process was 
launched by no other than Descartes, “le père de la philosophie pensante”, who placed “la nature 
et l’évidence” at the centre of his investigations. 101  Although some of his positions and 
assumptions needed to be corrected by his successors, there is no denying that Descartes and 
his method were essential to the “heureuse et mémorable révolution dont nous goûtons 
aujourd’hui les avantages”.102  
However, this development has reached a point where, according to the author, it becomes clear 
that the intrinsic tendency of the “raison géométrique” to transcend all borders needs to become 
aware of its limits.103 In fact, this kind of philosophical spirit and its methodical quest for 
knowledge are characterized for Guénard by a profound “intemperance” and “ivre[sse]”: “cette 
raison qui ne connaît plus de retour, quand une fois elle a franchi les bornes”.104 The idea of 
human knowledge being related to certain boundaries beyond which it starts losing its sense 
constitutes the epistemological centrepiece of Guénard’s critical reflections. The author 
consequently asks, “quelles sont donc […] les bornes où doit se renfermer l’esprit 
philosophique”; more specifically “les bornes qu’il doit se prescrire relativement aux divers 
objets dont il s’occupe”.105 
The answer is obvious‚ as Guénard immediately concludes: “la nature elle-même l’avertit à tout 
moment de sa faiblesse”.106 This leads us to the anthropological basis of the argument which is 
essential to the rhetoric of the heart: the fundamentally finite character of human nature.107 It is 
precisely in its will to disregard this primordial condition and the needs of the “cœur humain”108 
that a wrongly conceived esprit philosophique finally becomes dogmatic, carried away by its 
own “intemperance”, turning into the opposite of what it set out for. Faced with this “excès”, 
the author brings to mind the very foundations of the philosophical spirit and advocates the 																																																								
99 On the widespread academic genre of the eulogy (“éloge”) see Roche, Le siècle des lumières en province, vol. 1, p. 344 
and pp. 166–171. Beyond the prize contests, the eulogy was an important medium for the shaping of a collective 
identity among the academicians. As such, it did not remain uncriticized by the philosophes.  
100 “Discours qui a remporté le prix en l’année 1755”, in: Pièces d’éloquence qui ont remporté le prix de l’Académie française, 
1750–1763, vol. 3, Paris 1764, pp. 73–98, here pp. 75–76 and p. 81. 
101 Ibid., pp. 79–80. 
102 Ibid., p. 80.  
103 Ibid., p. 89.  
104 Ibid., p. 94. 
105 Ibid. and p. 84 (my emphasis). See also ibid., p. 74. 
106 Ibid. p. 94 (my emphasis). 
107 See also ibid., pp. 96–97.  
108 Ibid., p. 90. 
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“exacte sobriété”.109 It thus becomes clear that the text, far from simply repeating orthodox 
religious arguments, is not critical of the esprit philosophique as such. The critique starts at the 
point where methodical reasoning transgresses and ignores the multiple borders within which 
human knowledge is situated. The text thus makes the case, typical of the rhetoric of the heart, 
for an augmented epistemic sensitivity to boundaries and transitions. This becomes particularly 
manifest when the author addresses the relation of the esprit philosophique with religion as well 
as with matters of taste (“gout”), especially the arts. 
Religion and the “esprit éclairé” are anything but contradictions to Guénard.110 Again, the 
legitimate range of knowledge in these matters depends on how the line “séparant les opinions 
humaines des vérités sacrées de la religion” is drawn.111 In this particular realm however, the 
“faiblesse” of man and the shortcomings of the esprit géométrique are particularly striking. 
Hence, when the rationalistic viewpoint is hypostatised reason turns into its opposite and “votre 
sagesse est convaincue de folie et […] à force d’être philosophe, vous cessez d’être 
raisonnable”. 112  With its unifying gaze overlooking the necessity of boundaries, the 
philosophical spirit must especially be blind to the depth (“profondeur”) of the phenomena it 
tries to grasp. The dimension of “profondeur”, accessible only through the specific insights of 
the heart (“cœur”), actually becomes the central epistemic objection to the universal claims of 
the esprit philosophique.113 What this reasoning fundamentally lacks, is the ability “de […] 
comprendre l’infini”114 since it permanently treats this dimension like a quantifiable entity.115 
At the same time, questions concerning taste and the arts reveal that the “raison géométrique” 
is too monolithic a conception to represent the diverse intellectual faculties of man which 
require a plurality of methods. Hence for Guénard, the “discours méthodiques” trying to explain 
the logic of art which is “presque toute entière dans le cœur et l’imagination” are doomed to 
fail. They especially fall short of the in-between-dimension of “nuances”.116 This reveals the 
universal categories of the philosophical spirit as being simply “[des] abstractions idéales”, too 
remote from the phenomena at stake.117 Against the geometric reasoning à la Descartes which 
is “accoutumé […] à dépouiller les objets de leurs qualités particulières, pour ne leur laisser 
																																																								
109 Ibid., p. 92 and p. 94. 
110 Ibid., p. 92. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., p. 96. 
113 Ibid., especially pp. 95–96. 
114 Ibid., p. 96. 
115 “Ce grain de sable que je foule aux pieds est un abîme que tu ne peux sonder; et tu voudrais mesurer la hauteur et 
la profondeur de la sagesse éternelle […] par cette pensée, trop étroite pour embrasser un atome?”, ibid., pp. 96–97. 
116 Ibid., p. 91. 
117 Ibid., p. 90. 
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que des qualités vagues et générales qui ne sont rien pour le cœur humain”,118 Guénard thus 
becomes the advocate of the irreducible material and sensual dimension of all worldly 
phenomena. It is only the “faits éclatants et sensibles” which make truth graspable and 
understandable.119 And that, for the Jesuit Guénard, also applies – or rather especially applies 
– to religious truth.120 It is “touchante dans ses preuves comme dans sa morale” and destined to 
“entrer dans l’âme par tous les sens”.121 A form of rhetoric which is acquainted with the secrets 
of the heart is conscious of the limits of reason and hence for Guénard the more appropriate – 
and the more valid kind of knowledge. Above all, it is the expression of the various intellectual 
faculties of man and possesses a sufficiently complex notion of human practice and experience.  
The latter idea is developed particularly in the answer by the Abbé Millot selected for the 
eloquence prize of the Académie de Dijon for 1757: “Est-il plus utile d’étudier les hommes que 
les livres?”.122 Millot’s argument (in favour of studying men rather than books) is essentially 
based on a conception of cœur as the crucial intellectual and sensible faculty of man. The text 
actually develops the central anthropological assumptions of the rhetoric of affect, which has 
left such a strong mark on the rhetorical prize questions of the 18th century, by giving an 
especially dense and detailed description of the paradoxes of the human heart. Man is thus 
depicted as “ce mélange singulier de perfections et de défauts”.123 His heart, “ce théâtre fertile 
en scènes toujours variées”, is nothing less than the fiercely contested site of pure becoming, 
“où les désirs se choquent, s’engloutissent perpétuellement les uns les autres; où les passions, 
sous une infinité de formes, produisent une infinité d’effets étranges et presque incroyables”.124 
In light of the conflicting energies that run through his soul (“âme”) man must remain a stranger 
even to himself: “tant de fibres entrelacées et confondues qui composent le cœur humain; ces 
contrastes d’humeurs, de passions, de sentiments qui mettent entre les âmes plus de différence, 
que l’œil le plus perçant n’en aperçoit entre les visages; ces métamorphoses rapides et 
fréquentes qui souvent nous rendent méconnaissables à nous-mêmes; ces variétés si délicates 
																																																								
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., p. 95. This is indeed a crucial conviction for the defenders of the rhetoric of the heart: “Combien peu sont 
assez dégagés des sens pour être touchés de la vérité, si on ne la rend sensible et agréable! L’éloquence, pour ménager 
notre faiblesse, nous présente cette vérité sous l’appas du plaisir”. Recueil […] des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 
1733, p. 171 (cited above, note 80). 
120 On the Jesuit tradition of this conception of religious truth see Stéphane Van Damme, “Culture rhétorique et culture 
scientifique: crise ou mutation de la poétique des savoirs dans la Compagnie de Jésus en France (1630–1730)”, in: 
Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 55/154 (2005), pp. 55–69, here especially pp. 59–62.  
121 “Discours qui a remporté le prix en l’année 1755”, p. 98. 
122 Cf. Claude-François-Xavier Millot, “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, in: idem, 
Discours académiques sur divers sujets, Lyon 1760, pp. 78–134. 
123 Ibid., p. 85. 
124 Ibid. 
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et multipliées à l’infini”.125 According to Millot, only a self-reflective thinking grounded in 
introspection, “la connaissance de soi-même”126, and focussing essentially on human practices 
is able to shed at least some light on this overwhelming complexity. Believing that “la vraie 
peinture des hommes, ce sont leurs discours et leurs actions”127 and that “le premier devoir de 
l’homme est de contempler son être, d’en étudier à fond la nature”128 Millot dismisses the 
“méditations abstraites” of purely theoretical book knowledge. 129  This is why he is also 
sceptical of the capacity of the natural sciences (“les sciences exactes”130) – which Millot, 
himself a partisan of the Enlightenment,131 admires and endorses in his text more firmly than 
Guénard – to illuminate the nature of man beyond a certain point. The scientific method fails 
to recognise the extent to which human knowledge is grounded in practices and tends to 
construct abstract systems of nature “tandis que ceux qui l’habitent […] nous sont à peine 
connus”. 132  The most fundamental form of knowledge is hence the study of “les abîmes 
profonds du cœur humain” and no other branch of learning could be more suitable for that 
purpose than rhetoric.133 For Millot, “le grand art de persuader” had always possessed the 
theoretical insight into the passions of man and at the same time the ability to influence and 
alter his actions.134 Revised, in an age of sciences, as an instrument “méthodique et profonde” 
“[qui] creuse les principes, développe les conséquences, démontre à l’homme ce qu’il doit être”, 
while simultaneously preserving its distinctive aesthetic sensitivity, rhetoric turns for Millot 
into the new leading discipline connecting theory to practice.135  As the most outstanding 
example of this novel “science des mœurs” the author mentions Montesquieu and his approach 
in the Esprit des Lois.136 This is why Millot can finally conclude: “l’étude des hommes, loin de 																																																								
125 Ibid., pp. 88–89. 
126 Ibid., p. 90. On this self-reflective dimension see also ibid., p. 92. It has to be emphasised again that the turn towards 
the inner nature of man is typical of the rhetoric of the heart: “L’éloquence […] nous fait puiser en nous-mêmes et 
développer ces connaissances”. Recueil […] des Jeux Floraux, pour les prix de l’année 1733, p. 171 (cited above, note 80). 
127 “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 89. Accordingly, the value of rules and methods 
for Millot essentially depends on how “je tâche de les mettre en pratique”, ibid., p. 104. 
128 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
129 Ibid., p. 113. 
130 Ibid., p. 114. 
131 After the success of his works on French and English history from the late 1760s, Claude-François-Xavier Millot 
(1726–1785), who had originally been a teacher of rhetoric at the Jesuit collège of Lyon (which he had to leave for an 
eulogy on Montesquieu in 1757), won the support of the philosophes and became a member of the Académie française 
(1777) where he was especially endorsed by d’Alembert. Later he also became the preceptor to the duc d’Enghien. See 
Dictionnaire historique, ou Biographie universelle des hommes qui se sont fait un nom […] par F.-X. de Feller, vol. 4, 8th Ed., Paris 
1839, p. 451. 
132 “Discours qui a remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 87. For this critique of the scientific method 
see also ibid., pp. 113–116.   
133 Ibid., p. 94. 
134 Ibid., p. 124. See also ibid., pp. 121–123. 
135 Ibid., p. 117. 
136 Ibid., p. 116. For the praise of Montesquieu see ibid., pp. 109–113. Here, Millot also reacts to criticism which his 
defence of Montesquieu had provoked before and which may have been the origin of his demission at the Jesuit collège 
of Lyon. 
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mettre obstacle aux autres études, les anime et les dirige […]. Peut-on trop se livrer à une étude 
aussi propre à satisfaire l’esprit qu’à former le cœur?”.137 
V. Conclusion 
To sum up, I want to point out the specific constellation into which the knowledge of the textual 
tradition and the empirical knowledge of nature enter in the light of the rhetorical prize 
questions of the French academies in the 18th century. Yet, it has to be emphasised again that 
none of the arguments we have encountered in the context of the concours is genuinely new. In 
particular, the critique of science analysed in the two examples above had been presented in its 
main aspects in the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, in the answers given by Longepierre 
and Huet to Fontenelle’s and Perrault’s astonishing extension of scientific method to the realms 
of arts and rhetoric.138 Vico should then elaborate quite similar philosophical arguments in De 
nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1708), though this text did not become an important 
reference in the contemporary debates in France.139 Here, the critical discussion of the esprit 
philosophique and its epistemological limits was further nurtured, albeit from a sensualist point 
of view, by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos in his Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture 
(1719) which remained very influential throughout the century.140  
What is particularly striking about the prize questions is the fact that at a certain point in the 
evolution of this genre a critique of the exact sciences and their claim to universal knowledge 
arises; a critique that is developed and presented from a rhetorical point of view. At the same 
time, the selected discourses – at least a significant part of them, which were also awarded the 
prizes of renowned conservative academies like the Jeux Floraux – reflect the shifts in the 
epistemological foundations of rhetoric related to the rise of the natural sciences and the insight 
into the sensual and affective nature of man. Clearly, we are dealing with a changed kind of 
rhetoric that has reacted to the major epistemic transformations in the Republic of Letters. It 
must also be noted, however, that this particular perspective on affects remains rather 
metaphorical. It is not interested in an interpretation based on a more empirical description of 
emotions which was a central aim of contemporary philosophy in its search of “une esthétique 
																																																								
137 Ibid., p. 132 and p. 134. 
138 See especially Larry F. Norman, The Shock of the Ancient. Literature and History in Early Modern France, Chicago/London 
2011, pp. 153–155, 200–223 and p. 257; Marc Fumaroli, “Les abeilles et les araignées”, in: La Querelle des Anciens et des 
Modernes, XVIIème–XVIIIème siècles, ed. Anne-Marie Lecoq, Paris 2001, pp. 7–218, here especially pp. 178–196. 
139 See ibid., pp. 202–203. On Vico’s epistemological position see Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, pp. 436–444. 
140 See Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment. A Genealogy, Chicago/London 2010, pp. 24–29; on the deeper philosophical 
implications of Du Bos’ arguments see Kondylis, Die Aufklärung, pp. 314–319. 
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des passions […] centrée sur l’étude de la subjectivité cognitive et affective”.141 Notably, the 
rhetoric of the heart – at least as it appears in the specific medium of the prize questions – does 
not get to the level of individual emotions as it basically follows a pre-subjective conception.142 
The affective turn of rhetoric, its change into an instrument essentially conceived to understand 
the passions of the human heart, was certainly not exclusively the result of the Cartesian 
rethinking of language and eloquence by Lamy and the logicians of Port-Royal. All of the major 
treatises on les passions humaines since the 17th century, from Coeffeteau to Senault and 
Bouhours, raised the status of affects in the interaction of body and soul against the traditional 
theological doxa and sought to reconceive morals as the right use of passions.143 And there is 
of course the influential moralist tradition which for one of their chief exponents, La 
Rochefoucauld, makes it possible to note in his Maximes (1665), in a way as natural as 
axiomatic: “Les passions sont les seuls orateurs qui persuadent toujours. Elles sont comme un 
art de la nature dont les règles sont infaillibles; et l’homme le plus simple qui a de la passion 
persuade mieux que le plus éloquent qui n’en a point”.144 The fact that the Académie de Dijon 
chose one of La Rochefoucauld’s maxims for its concours in 1757 – “Il est plus nécessaire 
d’étudier les hommes que les livres” –145 shows not only the high esteem for the authors of the 
siècle classique but also how strong the influence of the moralist tradition was at the academies 
and among the public addressed by the concours in the 18th century.  
What is more, this way of thinking did not share the Cartesian affirmation of science. On the 
contrary, it was, both in its style and in its philosophical outlook, fundamentally sceptical of the 
scientific claim to truth. This becomes most evident, as mentioned above, in Pascal’s notions 
of cœur and esprit de finesse. Beyond Lamy, the moralist tradition must hence be considered a 
major source of inspiration for the rhetoric of the heart in the prize questions and for its critique 
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of science.146 As far as the latter is concerned, Anthony Grafton is certainly right when he warns 
us not to assume that “the two cultures” of scientists and humanists were “locked in the battle 
that the pamphleteers of the New Philosophy called for; they coexisted and often 
collaborated”.147 Yet in France since the end of the 17th century, notably since the Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes, there is, at least on the theoretical level, an intense discourse on the 
methodological differences and epistemological incompatibilities between them.  
Believing that the intuitions of the heart are a “sentiment […] auquel il faut se livrer pour le 
connaître, et que l’âme est d’autant moins capable d’étudier, qu’elle en est plus affectée”148 the 
rhetoric of affect, as presented in the rhetorical prize questions, turns against the 
epistemological ideal of science. Essentially assuming that human knowledge is finite and valid 
only within certain boundaries and that man’s various intellectual faculties are founded in an 
intuitive comprehension of the world beyond conceptual knowledge, it formulates a 











146 With the moralist authors not explicitly quoted (neither is Lamy) and footnotes remaining rare in the texts submitted 
to the rhetorical prize questions – a medium deeply rooted in the ideal of orality – there is no direct evidence of this 
obvious philosophical relation on the philological level. Pascal is mentioned once however by Millot, “Discours qui a 
remporté le prix à l’Académie de Dijon en 1757”, p. 107. At the same time, it is clear that as a medium at the intersection 
of diverse common opinions, positions and theories the prize questions are too hybrid a source to look for one direct, 
‘original’ line of inspiration.  
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concours held by the Académie des Jeux Floraux in 1765: “Déterminer ce qu’il y a de fixe et d’arbitraire dans le gout”, 
in: Recueil des ouvrages de poésie et d’éloquence, présentés à l’Académie des Jeux Floraux, en l’année 1765, Toulouse 1765, pp. 57–
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